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The Notion of Member is the Heart of the Matter:  
On the Role of Membership Knowledge in  
Ethnomethodological Inquiry 
Paul ten Have∗ 
Abstract: In ethnomethodological inquiries, the tension be-
tween "subjectivity" and "objectivity" which is inherent in 
all qualitative social research, takes special meanings. In 
fact, those terms are rarely used in ethnomethodological re-
search reports, or methodological writings. What is widely 
implied and often explicitly recognised, however, is that an 
ethnomethodologist has to "understand" the practices stud-
ied, before they can be analysed, and that this "understand-
ing" involves the researcher using his or her "membership 
knowledge". In a way, this unavoidable use of membership 
knowledge for understanding what people are doing, is then 
turned from a implicit resource into an explicit topic for 
analysis. This can be illustrated by a consideration of the 
two research strategies for which ethnomethodology has be-
come (ill-) famous, the "breaching experiments" initiated by 
its founder Harold GARFINKEL, and the use of recordings 
and transcripts of verbal interaction by ethno-methodology's 
most successful off-shoot, Conversation Analysis as initia-
ted by Harvey SACKS. Varieties of a third strategy, ethnog-
raphy, including the ethnography of specific (sub-) cultural 
practices, of technology use, and auto-ethnography, will al-
so be discussed for its treatment of membership knowledge 
as resource and topic. 
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1. Introduction1 
In current qualitative research, the research process and its products are seen as 
inherently and unavoidably dependent on the "subjectivity" of the researcher, 
that is his or her "personal" characteristics and experiences. Furthermore, re-
flecting on this subjectivity, often labelled "reflexivity", including a public ac-
knowledgement of one's personal stake in the research products, is often pre-
sented as laudable, if not as a moral obligation. Ethnomethodology does not 
seem to participate in these current trends, without in general joining the con-
trastive party of objectivism. "Subjectivity" does not figure prominently in eth-
nomethodological writing, nor does "objectivity", while "reflexivity" is used in 
a particular ethnomethodological sense, not as a virtue but as an inherent prop-
erty of human life. It seems to make sense, therefore, to explore how eth-
nomethodologists deal with the issues which elsewhere are covered by "subjec-
tivity" and "reflexivity". My argument will be that ethnomethodology's appar-
ent exception is a consequence of its particular conception of the role of knowl-
edge in social life. In line with its SCHÜTZian heritage, ethnomethodology 
stresses the fact that persons, as members of society, use and rely on a corpus 
of practical knowledge which they assume is shared at least in part with others. 
This "use and reliance" is mostly tacit, "seen but unnoticed". "Membership 
knowledge" is commonly treated as a self-evident "resource" rather than as an 
explicit "topic". For ethnomethodology, then, membership knowledge is the 
key issue in any discussion of its topic, but also a crucial aspect of its own 
methodology. Ethnomethodologists are themselves also, and unavoidably, 
members. Therefore, I will, in this article, present a general discussion of the 
ways in which ethnomethodological research is carried out, with special atten-
tion to the role of membership knowledge. I will start with an overview of what 
ethnomethodology is all about, including an explication of the sense of the 
terms "member" and "membership". Next, I shall consider some of the various 
strategies used in ethnomethodological research, including the so-called breach-
ing experiments, the analysis of tapes and transcripts, and ethnography, in 
terms of their reliance on membership knowledge. In the final section, I will 
return to a discussion of the notions of "subjectivity" and "reflexivity", as used 
in qualitative social research at large, in the light of my observations on eth-
nomethodological research practices.  
                                                             
1  I have, in this text, freely used adapted fragments of earlier as well as current writings, includ-
ing TEN HAVE (1990) and (1999); see TEN HAVE (2004) for further elaborations. 
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2. What is Ethnomethodology 
As a first approximation,2 one can say that "ethnomethodology" (EM) is a 
special kind of social inquiry, dedicated to explicating the ways in which col-
lectivity members create and maintain a sense of order and intelligibility in 
social life. It has emerged as a distinctive perspective and style of social re-
search in the teachings and publications of one man, Harold GARFINKEL. 
From a varied set of "sources of inspiration", including on the one hand most 
prominently his teacher and PhD supervisor Talcott PARSONS, and on other 
the phenomenological philosophies of Alfred SCHUTZ, Aron GURWITSCH 
and Edmund HUSSERL, he has forged a new vision of what social inquiry 
could be. Taking off from PARSONS' synthesization of various classical tradi-
tions of sociological theorising, one can say that in ethnomethodology these 
have been "turned on their heads". For the DURKHEIMian strand in classical 
sociology, and social research more generally, the ultimate goal is to investi-
gate "social facts", and their determinants, where "social facts" have the twin 
characteristic of being both "external" and "constraining" to the actions of 
individuals. In ethnomethodology, on the other hand – to adapt a phrase from 
Melvin POLLNER (1974, p. 27) – "facts are treated as accomplishments", that 
is, they are seen as being produced in and through members' practical activities.  
In other words, while classical (DURKHEIMian) sociology is in the busi-
ness of explaining social facts, the effort of ethnomethodology is directed to-
wards an explication of their constitution. In his Le suicide: Étude de sociolo-
gie, Emile DURKHEIM tried to explain variations in suicide rates in terms of 
variations in kinds of social integration. An ethnomethodologist, however, might 
investigate the ways in which cases of sudden death get constituted as being 
"suicides", or, at a different level, how statistical information about various 
"rates" is used to construct a sociological explanation of suicide in terms of so-
cial "causes".3  
For sociology, and social research in general, the interest in the factual 
status of "social facts" is limited to technical and practical issues of getting 
those facts right, in a methodologically sound way, and at reasonable costs. 
There is, for instance, an enormous methodological literature on designing, im-
plementing and analysing social surveys. This literature is focussed on meth-
odological choices that should guarantee a sufficient level of representative-
                                                             
2  My characterisation of ethnomethodology is a personal and selective one. Among the many 
other sources, I would specifically suggest to consult HERITAGE (1984) for a broad scholarly 
overview, SHARROCK and ANDERSON (1986) for a concise and sharp discussion of basic 
issues, BUTTON (1991) for a collection of essays dealing with ethnomethodological ways of 
treating some of the classic themes of the human sciences, and LYNCH (1993) for pointed and 
polemical discussions confronting ethnomethodology and the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge. 
3  GARFINKEL (1967a, pp. 11-18; 1967b), see also ATKINSON (1978) for some early efforts 
in these directions. 
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ness, validity and reliability, and on practical problems of avoiding sampling 
error, non-response, interviewer influences on answering behaviour, misunder-
standings between interviewers and respondents, etc. For ethnomethodology, 
survey design and analysis, and survey interviewing, are interesting as possible 
topics for study as are other kinds of accountable professional practice. The 
stance taken in such an investigation would not be one of "methodological" or 
"practical" interest, but rather "disinterested" as to the purpose or the practices 
studied, a stance which has been called "ethnomethodological indifference" 
(GARFINKEL & SACKS 1970, p. 345). In other words, ethnomethodology 
might be interested in studying survey-related practices as such, as exemplary 
ways in which the factual status of "social facts" is being established for the 
practical purpose of doing a survey.4 In a similar way, one can find ethnometh-
odological studies of various practical activities that constitute qualitative re-
search, such as "open-ended interviewing" or "ethnographic reporting".5  
Ethnomethodology's relationship with its "mother discipline" sociology, and 
by extension to all "social science", is then rather ambiguous. Both share a deep 
interest in problems of social order and try to elucidate the organisation of 
social life in all its manifestations. But their general approach is tangential to 
one another. I would like to stress that this "tangentiality" should not in the first 
place be seen as a difference in "research methods", as ordinarily conceived, 
but, as stated above, as one of "interests", "problematics" or "conception". 
Rather than focussing on issues like the choice between qualitative and quanti-
tative research, the problem is one of research purpose, or the functions various 
methods are having in the argumentation of a research project. Indeed, the 
observation that ethnomethodological enquiries have a "qualitative" character, 
does not produce, by itself, a commonality of analytic interests with other kinds 
of qualitative social research. 
3. Some Core Concepts in Ethnomethodology 
It may be useful, at this point, to discuss some characteristic analytic notions 
that have been used in GARFINKEL's most prominent ethnomethodological 
studies.  
                                                             
4  Cf. BENSON and HUGHES (1991) for an ethnomethodological consideration of survey 
research logic, LYNCH (2002) for an explication of ethnomethodological as contrasted with 
survey research interests, and HOUTKOOP-STEENSTRA (1995, 2000), and various contri-
butions to MAYNARD, HOUTKOOP-STEENSTRA, SCHAEFFER and VAN DER ZOU-
WEN (2002) for studies of survey interviewing. 
5  Cf. BAKER (1997), MAZELAND (1992), MAZELAND and TEN HAVE (1996), ROUL-
STON (2001), RAPLEY (2001) on qualitative interviews, TEN HAVE (2001) on ethno-
graphic reporting. 
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3.1 Accountability and reflexivity 
In the first two pages of his Preface to the Studies in ethnomethodology, GAR-
FINKEL has given a very dense characterisation of his program. Here is one 
crucial passage: 
"Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities as members' meth-
ods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-
practical-purposes, i.e., 'accountable,' as organizations of commonplace eve-
ryday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of 
practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common sense knowledge of 
social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning. By permitting us to 
locate and examine their occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon estab-
lishes their study." (GARFINKEL 1967a, p. VII)  
The two core notions provided here are "accountability" and "reflexivity" and it 
should be noted right away that these terms get a rather special meaning in GAR-
FINKEL's hands. While "accountability" in ordinary talk is often associated with 
liability, here it is closer to intelligibility or explainability, in the sense that actors 
are supposed to design their actions in such a way that their sense is clear right 
away or at least explicable on demand. People who stand in line for a service 
point, for example, show that they are doing just that by the way they position 
their bodies, but they are also able to understand and answer a question like "Are 
you standing in line?" or "Are you in the queue?" So the understandability and 
expressability of an activity as a sensible action is, at the same time, an essential 
part of that action. GARFINKEL uses "reflexivity" to focus on that "incarnate" 
property, as in the following quote from the start of his explication of ethnometh-
odology. 
"The following studies seek to treat practical activities, practical circum-
stances, and practical sociological reasoning as topics of empirical studies, 
and by paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention 
usually accorded extraordinary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena 
in their own right. Their central recommendation is that the activities whereby 
members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are iden-
tical with members' procedures for making those settings 'account-able.' The 
'reflexive,' or 'incarnate' character of accounting practices and accounts makes 
up the crux of that recommendation." (GARFINKEL 1967a, p. 1)  
Over the last few decades, the concept of "reflexivity", which basically just 
denotes an object's relation to itself, has mostly been used in the social sciences 
in the sense of a call to a self-conscious view of social science's activities. Such 
a moral-political appeal should be clearly distinguished from GARFINKEL's 
use of the term (cf. LYNCH 2000; MACBETH 2001). I will return to this 
difference in the final section of this paper. 
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3.2 Indexicality 
Over the course of his successive publications, GARFINKEL has used a num-
ber of terms to denote local, time-bound and situational aspects of action. 
Prominent in the early work was "indexical", as in "indexical expressions", or 
when discussed as a property: "indexicality". Indexical expressions are, in prin-
ciple those whose sense depends on the local circumstances in which they are 
uttered and/or those to which they apply. Expressions like "you" or "yesterday" 
are obvious examples. But then, if you think of it, on all occasions, all expres-
sions (and actions) are in fact indexical. GARFINKEL writes about "the unsat-
isfied programmatic distinction between and substitutability of objective for 
indexical expressions" (GARFINKEL 1967a, pp. 4-7). 
"Features of indexical expressions motivate endless methodological studies di-
rected to their remedy. Indeed, attempts to rid the practices of a science of 
these nuisances lends to each science its distinctive character of preoccupation 
and productivity with methodological issues. Research practitioners' studies of 
practical activities of a science, whatever their science, afford them endless 
occasions to deal rigorously with indexical expressions.  
[...] 
Nevertheless, wherever practical actions are topics of study the promised dis-
tinction and substitutability of objective for indexical expressions remains pro-
grammatic in every particular case and in every actual occasion in which the 
distinction or substitutability must be demonstrated. In every actual case with-
out exception, conditions will be cited that a competent investigator will be 
required to recognize, such that in that particular case the terms of the demon-
stration can be relaxed and nevertheless the demonstration be counted an ade-
quate one." (GARFINKEL 1967a, p. 6)  
In other words, bridging the gulf between on the one hand abstract notions, as 
expressed in so-called objective (that is context-free) expressions, and on the 
other hand concrete instances which are inevitably tied to local circumstances 
and contexts, is an endless task. This task is always cut-off before it is com-
pletely finished, that is, as soon as the practical circumstances demand and 
allow a solution which is "good enough" for the purpose at hand. Indexical ex-
pressions are the preferred means for such solutions and are therefore the cho-
sen topic for ethnomethodological investigations.  
"The properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions are ordered 
properties. These consist of organizationally demonstrable sense, or facticity, 
or methodic use, or agreement among 'cultural colleagues.' Their ordered 
properties consist of organizationally demonstrable rational properties of in-
dexical expressions and indexical actions. Those ordered properties are ongo-
ing achievements of the concerted commonplace activities of investigators. 
The demonstrable rationality of indexical expressions and indexical actions re-
tains over the course of its managed production by members the character of 
ordinary, familiar, routinized practical circumstances. 
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[...] 
I use the term 'ethnomethodology' to refer to the investigation of the rational 
properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent 
ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life." 
(GARFINKEL 1967a, p. 11)  
So what we have as an "essential tension" in social life is that indexicality can 
never be fully "repaired" by substituting abstract and objective, supra-situation-
al expressions, descriptions or instructions for inevitably "inexact" indexical 
expressions and acts. But, at the same time, practical actors always are able to 
"get by" in one way or another. Or, to borrow from a notion that came to be 
used later in GARFINKEL's writings (such as 1991), the philosophical problem 
of the gulf between the abstract and general on the one hand and the concrete 
and situational on the other, can, for ethnomethodological purposes, be respeci-
fied as a problem that members of society solve as a matter of course in their 
everyday activities.  
3.3 The documentary method 
This theme surfaces again and again in the later chapters of Studies in eth-
nomethodology. Chapter 3, for instance, discusses – and demonstrates – what 
GARFINKEL calls "the documentary method of interpretation", which he 
defines in the following way: 
"The method consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document of,' as 
'pointing to,' as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern. Not 
only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evi-
dences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted 
on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to 
elaborate the other." (GARFINKEL 1967a, p. 78)  
So here again we see a kind of two-layered model of social knowledge: the 
abstract layer of general knowledge, here "patterns", elsewhere "objective ex-
pressions", or in SCHUTZ' work "typifications", and the concrete level of actu-
al instances, situated actions, here "documents", and elsewhere "indexical ex-
pressions". The always awaiting task, the "contingent ongoing accomplishment 
of organized artful practices of everyday life", is to connect the two, by giving 
accounts, by adding "etc. clauses" to statements, etc. (sic). It is that condition 
that is responsible, so to speak, for the "incarnate reflexivity" discussed before. 
3.4 Some recent themes 
A cluster of interrelated themes in GARFINKEL's later work have to be men-
tioned here. While some of his early writings could be read to suggest that 
ethnomethodology would be in the business of formulating general rules, state-
ments, practices or procedures used in the constitution of local social orders, 
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the later work stresses the idea that those practices etc. are too intimately tied to 
the occasions at which they are being used to be discussed "independently" of 
them. This has been especially clear in ethnomethodological studies of a range 
of complicated professional activities, as in studies of research laboratories 
(LYNCH 1985 and many other publications), mathematical proofing (LIVING-
STON 1986) and piano improvisation (SUDNOW 1978, 2001). The general 
idea is that conventional studies of various specialised "trades" miss the essen-
tial "what" of those trades in favour of traditional sociological features like 
"professionalization", "status considerations", "lines of communication", etc. 
GARFINKEL has suggested that in order to be able to study the specifics – the 
"quiddity" or "just whatness" – that make up a particular trade, an investigator 
should develop a rather deep competence in that trade. This has been called the 
"unique adequacy requirement of methods" (GARFINKEL & WIEDER 1992). 
Still later GARFINKEL dropped the term "quiddity" or "just whatness" in fa-
vour of "haecceity" or "just thisness", presumably in order to avoid suggestions 
of a stable "core" that would define a particular practice. Whatever the fancy 
terms, the urge is still to study the rational, in the sense of reasonable, proper-
ties of indexical expressions and indexical actions (GARFINKEL & SACKS 
1970). As already stated, the mission of recent ethnomethodology has been 
formulated a one of "respecification" of the classic concepts of western science 
and philosophy, such as "order", "logic", "rationality", "action", etc., as mem-
bers' practices (cf. BUTTON 1991; LYNCH 1993; LYNCH & BOGEN 1996). 
In other words, the grand themes of our intellectual culture are taken up in a 
fresh way as embodied in local, situated and intelligible practices.  
3.5 Membership 
Both in my own text above, and in the various quotes from GARFINKEL, the 
concept of "member(s)" was used in places where others might have chosen 
"person(s)" or "individual(s)". This usage is a principled one. Ethnomethodol-
ogy is not interested in "individuals" as such, but in the competences involved 
in being a bona-fide member of a collectivity. As GARFINKEL writes in a 
note: 
"I use the term 'competence' to mean the claim that a collectivity member is 
entitled to exercise that he is capable of managing his everyday affairs without 
interference. That members can take such claims for granted I refer to by 
speaking of a person as a 'bona-fide' collectivity member. (...) The terms 'col-
lectivity' and 'collectivity member' are intended in strict accord with Talcott 
Parsons' usage in The Social System [...]" (GARFINKEL 1967a, p. 57, n. 8)  
In their collaborative essay, Harold GARFINKEL and Harvey SACKS (1970) 
have elaborated this point as follows: 
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"The notion of member is the heart of the matter. We do not use the term to 
refer to a person. It refers instead to mastery of natural language, which we 
understand in the following way. 
We offer the observation that persons, because of the fact that they are heard 
to be speaking a natural language, somehow are heard to be engaged in the ob-
jective production and objective display of commonsense knowledge of eve-
ryday activities as observable and reportable phenomena. We ask what it is 
about natural language that permits speakers and auditors to hear, and in other 
ways to witness, the objective production and objective display of common-
sense knowledge, and of practical circumstances, practical actions, and practi-
cal sociological reasoning as well. What is it about natural language that 
makes these phenomena observable-reportable, that is account-able phenom-
ena? For speakers and auditors the practices of natural language somehow ex-
hibit these phenomena in the particulars of speaking and that these phenomena 
are exhibited is thereby itself made exhibitable in further description, remark, 
questions, and in other ways for the telling. 
The interests of ethnomethodological research are directed to provide, through 
detailed analyses, that account-able phenomena are through and through prac-
tical accomplishments. We shall speak of 'the work' of that accomplishment in 
order to gain the emphasis for it of an ongoing course of action. The work is 
done as assemblages of practices whereby speakers in the situated particulars 
of speech mean something different from what they can say in just so many 
words, that is, as 'glossing practices.'" (GARFINKEL & SACKS 1970, p. 342) 
In short, the notion of "member" refers to capacities or competencies that peo-
ple have as members of society; capacities to speak, to know, to understand, to 
act in ways that are sensible in that society and in the situations in which they 
find themselves. The problem, then, with which I deal in this paper is how eth-
nomethodological studies use and depend upon the active use of membership 
knowledge in order to study "membership" as a phenomenon.  
4. Ethnomethodology and Common Sense Procedures 
Since ethnomethodology has an interest in the procedural study of common 
sense as it is used practically, it is faced with a peculiar methodological prob-
lem. This may be glossed as "the problem of the invisibility of common sense". 
Members have a practical rather than a theoretical interest in their constitutive 
work. They take common sense and its constitutive practices for granted, un-
less some sorts of "trouble" make attention necessary. So an early strategy of 
GARFINKEL was to "breach" expectations in order to generate this kind of 
trouble (GARFINKEL 1963, 1964; 1967a, pp. 35-75). For ethnomethodology, 
common sense practices are the topic of study, but those practices are also, 
unavoidably, used as a resource for any study one may try to undertake (c.f. 
ZIMMERMAN & POLLNER 1971). Without the use of common sense, its 
object of study would be simply unavailable, because it is constituted by the 
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application of common sense methods, such as "the documentary method of 
interpretation" (GARFINKEL 1967a, pp. 76-103). So the problem for ethno-
methodology is how common sense practices and common sense knowledge 
can lose their status as an unexamined "resource", in order to be a "topic" for 
analysis. Formulated in this way, it is a double-faced problem: on the one hand 
a problem of minimising the unexamined use of common sense, and on the 
other that of maximising its examinability. This double-sided problem seems to 
be in principle unsolvable, one is bound to lose either the resource or the topic. 
So what one has to do is to find practical solutions, which are unavoidably 
compromises. I will presently suggest a typology of the solutions that have 
been tried in ethnomethodology so far.  
The first strategy is especially prominent in GARFINKEL's early work 
(1963, 1964, 1967a). This strategy consists of the close study of sense-making 
activities in situations where they are especially prominent. Such situations are 
those in which sharp discrepancies, between on the one hand existing expecta-
tions and/or competencies, and on the other practical behavioural and/or inter-
pretive tasks, necessitate extraordinary sense-making efforts by members. Such 
situations may occur naturally – as in the case of a "transsexual" studied by 
GARFINKEL (1967a, pp. 116-85) – or they may be created on purpose – as in 
the "breaching experiments", mentioned before.  
In order to escape some of the practical and ethical problems generated by 
such experiments, a second strategy was developed. In this researchers study 
their own sense-making work by putting themselves in some kind of extra-
ordinary situation. This may be a situation where routine sense-making proce-
dures are bound to fail, or where one has to master a difficult and unknown 
task, or where one is instructed by a setting's members to see the world in a 
way that is natural for them but not for oneself. MEHAN and WOOD (1975) 
use the expression "becoming the phenomenon", while SCHWARTZ and JA-
COBS (1979) recommend strategies of becoming The Stranger or The Novice. 
Out of many possible examples I would like to mention David SUDNOW's 
(1978, 2001) study of becoming a jazz piano player, and Lawrence WIEDER's 
(1974) study of his being instructed in the use of "the Convict Code" as a gen-
eral interpretive and explanatory device in a half-way house for paroled ad-
dicts. A special case of a "procedural self-study" is available in a book by Al-
bert ROBILLARD, Meaning of a Disability: The Lived Experience of Paraly-
sis, (1999), in which he describes his experiences as a disabled person suffering 
from the ALS (Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis) disease. 
The third strategy is the one that most resembles traditional ethnographic 
fieldwork. It consists of closely observing situated activities in their natural 
settings and discussing them with the seasoned practitioners, in order to study 
the competences involved in the routine performance of these activities. To 
further this close study, or to be able to study these activities after the fact, 
recording equipment may be used, but quite often researchers using this strat-
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egy rely on traditional note-taking in order to produce their data. Examples of 
this kind of study can be found in GARFINKEL's (1967a, pp. 104-15) work on 
juries and coroners, ZIMMERMAN's (1969) study of case-workers in a welfare 
agency, and LYNCH's (1985) research on laboratory scientists.  
The forth strategy involves the study of ordinary practices by first mechani-
cally recording some of their "products", by the use of audio or video equip-
ment, as is the standard practice in Conversation Analysis (CA). These re-
cordings are then transcribed in a way that limits the use of common sense 
procedures to hearing what is being said and noting how it has been said. The 
transcriptions are used to locate some "orderly products". It is the analyst's task, 
then, to formulate a "device" which may have been used to produce that "prod-
uct" and phenomena like it (c.f. SACKS 1984).6  
In actual practice, these strategies tend to be combined in various ways. In 
examples of the first three types, a tendency exists to use literal quotes from 
what was said by the research subjects, as in GARFINKEL's (1963, 1964, 
1967a) reports of his "experiments", while in more recent studies recordings 
and transcripts tend to be used, as in GARFINKEL, LYNCH, and LIVING-
STON (1981) and LYNCH (1985). So a technical aspect of the fourth strategy 
is often adopted in the first three. WIEDER's study, here cited as exemplifying 
the second strategy can also be seen as an example of the third, as his analysis 
of his own learning of and being instructed in "seeing" the world of the half-
way house in terms of "the code" is embedded in general ethnographic descrip-
tions. There is a major difference, however, between the first three strategies – 
ethnomethodological studies in the stricter sense – and the fourth – CA, at least 
in its "pure" form. In the first set, specific circumstances are created or sought 
out, where sense-making activities are more prominent and consequently easier 
to be studied. In this way ethnomethodology displays a strategic preference for 
the extra-ordinary.7 In contrast to this, pure CA tends to focus on the utterly 
mundane, the ordinary chit-chat of everyday life. While in ethnomethodology 
the "visibility problem" is – in part – solved by the creation or selection of 
"strange" environments, in CA this "estranging" task is performed by the re-
cording machine and the transcription process. In more recent years, however, 
CA-type of analyses are increasingly embedded in and inspired by more ethno-
graphically informed understandings, especially in so-called "workplace stud-
ies" focussed on technologically complex environments.8  
The general idea lying behind the use of these strategies is thus to evade as 
far as possible the unthinking and unnoticed use of common sense that seems 
                                                             
6  Space forbids a more extensive discussion of this most successful branch of ethnomethodol-
ogy; current overviews include HUTCHBY and WOOFFITT (1998) and TEN HAVE (1999). 
7  This seems less so for the third type. There is a tendency, though, for selecting settings in 
which fact-production is a major task, as in the examples quoted earlier. 
8  See BUTTON (1993), HEATH and LUFF (2000), LUFF, HINDMARSH, and HEATH 
(2000), SUCHMAN (1993) and a number of other publications by these authors. 
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to be inherent in empirical research practices in sociology. The ethnomethod-
ological critique of these practices comes down to the objection that in so doing 
one studies idealised and de-contextualized "reconstructions" of social life, 
made by the research subjects and/or the researcher, instead of that life in its 
own situated particulars.9 So ethnographers may be said to study their own field 
notes as an unexamined resource for their study of a community's life. Or re-
searchers using interviews study the responses they have recorded as an unex-
amined resource for their study of "underlying" opinions and unobserved ac-
tivities. In both cases, the situated "production" of those materials is not given 
systematic attention in its own right. The theoretical objects of such studies 
tends to be either individuals or collectivities. In contrast to such a "methodo-
logical individualism" or "collectivism", ethnomethodology and CA prefer a 
position that is closer to what Karin KNORR-CETINA (1981, 1988) has called 
"methodological situationalism".10  
5. Common Sense as Inevitable Resource 
The above critique concerning researchers' reliance on common sense, i.e. their 
membership knowledge, can also be turned against ethnomethodology and CA 
themselves. Although the "unthinking" use of such knowledge may be mini-
mised, it cannot be eliminated completely, but this fact is not too often ac-
knowledged. I will now present three cases where ethnomethodological writers 
have discussed this problem quite frankly. The first of these is Don ZIM-
MERMAN's "Preface" to WIEDER's (1974) half-way house study.  
ZIMMERMAN points to the general, sensible and unavoidable use of what 
he calls "idealizations" in the natural and social sciences as well as in everyday 
life. Idealisations are selective, abstract and logically coherent constructions 
that are used to collect phenomena in terms of selected features judged to be 
relevant from a specific, for instance theoretical, point of view. Although he 
acknowledges the success of this procedure in the natural sciences, he sees 
certain drawbacks in its use in the social sciences: "a necessary consequence is 
the suppression of whole classes of data" (ZIMMERMAN 1974, p. 21). He 
specifically objects to the use of such idealisations that ignores the fact that 
idealisation is a feature of the social life studied itself. 
"Thus, ethnomethodologists would contend that these idealizations in the hu-
man sciences have ignored the fact that idealization occurs naturally within 
                                                             
9  For that reason those analyses are called "constructive" (GARFINKEL & SACKS 1970); cf. 
the quotes from ZIMMERMAN below. 
10  She has formulated this position in terms of the then-current micro/macro and agency/structure 
debates: "I shall call methodological situationalism the principle which demands that descrip-
tively adequate accounts of large-scale social phenomena be grounded in statements about ac-
tual social behaviour in concrete situations" (1988, p. 22). 
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the domain of scientific theorizing (which is, after all, done from within the 
world) and takes place as well within the domain of everyday life – in the 
form of common-sense typifications [...]. For ethnomethodology then, 'ideali-
zation' (of either scientific or common-sense form) is a phenomenon for study, 
not a resource [...]. Though ethnomethodologists must themselves idealize 
their phenomena in some fashion when pursuing an analysis, their approach 
differs from current constructive theorizing in that their idealizations attempt 
to incorporate the view that, from the outset, societal members recognize and 
accomplish the orderly structures of their world [...] via the use of idealiza-
tions. 
The phenomena of interest, then, are what Schutz (1962) refers to as second-
order phenomena, namely members' idealizations of their own and others' be-
havior [...] social reality consists of the common-sense, practical activity of 
everyday 'idealizations' of the social world and activities within it [...]. For eth-
nomethodologists, idealizations (or rational constructions) of the social world 
must be recognized as also having the features of being 'done from within the 
world' and being 'part and parcel of that world', i.e., what Garfinkel (1967) calls 
'reflexive features'." (ZIMMERMAN in WIEDER 1974, pp. 22-23)  
So idealisations are always and unavoidably used, in ordinary life as well as 
in the sciences. The point is to recognise this and to take it into account in one's 
own idealising practices. How this is to be done is less clear, however.  
My second case throws some light on this from a CA-inspired perspective. In a 
critique of "speech act theory" as proposed by J.L. AUSTIN, Roy TURNER 
writes: 
"As a solution to the vexed problem of the relation between the shared cultural 
knowledge (members' knowledge) that the sociologist possesses and the ana-
lytic apparatus that it is his responsibility to produce, I propose the following:  
A. The sociologist inevitably trades on his members' knowledge in recogniz-
ing the activities that participants to interaction are engaged in; for example, it 
is by virtue of my status as a competent member that I can recurrently locate 
in my transcripts instances of 'the same' activity. This is not to claim that 
members are infallible or that there is perfect agreement in recognizing any 
and every instances; it is only to claim that no resolution of problematic cases 
can be effected by resorting to procedures that are supposedly uncontaminated 
by members' knowledge. (Arbitrary resolutions, made for the sake of easing 
the problems of 'coding', are of course no resolution at all for the present en-
terprise.) 
B. The sociologist, having made his first-level decision on the basis of mem-
bers' knowledge, must then pose as problematic how utterances come off as 
recognizable unit activities. This requires the sociologist to explicate the re-
sources he shares with the participants in making sense of utterances in a 
stretch of talk. At every step of the way, inevitably, the sociologist will con-
tinue to employ his socialized competence, while continuing to make explicit 
what these resources are and how he employs them. I see no alternative to 
these procedures, except to pay no explicit attention to one's socialized knowl-
edge while continuing to use it as an indispensible aid. In short, sociological 
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discoveries are ineluctably discoveries from within the society." (TURNER 
1971, p. 177)  
What TURNER suggests is that ethnomethodological research is done in two 
phases. In the first the researcher uses his own membership knowledge to un-
derstand his materials, while in the second he analyses this understanding from 
a procedural perspective.11 What TURNER does not mention, but what has 
become a standard in CA afterwards, is that the analyst can inspect subsequent 
utterances to see whether these display any specific understandings of previous 
utterances, either by other participants, or by the original speaker himself or 
herself (cf. SACKS, SCHEGLOFF, & JEFFERSON, 1978, p. 44).  
The four strategy-types, discussed above, differ in the way in which they 
produce their materials. But always the study of these materials can be seen as 
organised in these two phases of membership understanding and procedural 
analysis. In WIEDER's (1974) book on a half-way house, for instance, the first 
part is largely devoted to an ethnographic study of the setting from which the 
concept of a Convict Code emerges, while the second deals with the ways in 
which this Code is used as a daily interpretive and explanatory device.  
My third case of ethnomethodologists discussing their reliance on member-
ship knowledge is taken from the book by Michael LYNCH and David BOGEN 
(1996) The spectacle of history: speech, text, and memory at the Iran-Contra 
hearings, which is the study of the ways in which the parties to these hearings 
struggle to have their version of "what happened" recorded as the facts of the 
case.  
In the introduction they write that their aim is to describe "the production of 
history", and not to "deconstruct" it. In fact, a major phenomenon in those 
hearings was the pervasiveness of "deconstruction" as a practical activity, as 
each party tried to undermine the accounts provided by the other. Therefore, 
"deconstruction does not identify our own methodological agenda, but instead 
it is a perspicuous feature of the struggle we describe". And they continue: 
"We shall assume an ability to describe and exhibit recognizable features of 
the video text we have chosen to examine. In this effort we shall inevitably 
engage in constructive (i.e., productive) practices, such as using the video text 
as a proxy for the live performances of interrogators and witnesses, and selec-
tively using written transcripts to exhibit recurrent discursive actions." 
(LYNCH & BOGEN 1996, p. 14)  
In other words, they rely on their own ordinary members' competences as any 
(informed) viewer/ hearer of the tapes would, and they concede that their own 
use of tapes and documents inevitably also involves "constructive" work, which 
might be criticised as well by others. 
"Although it is commonplace in the social sciences to lay out a set of meth-
odological procedures that provide reasonable foundations for the selection 
and interpretation of data, in this study we trust that readers will be able to 
                                                             
11  A similar model for ethnomethodological research has been developed by Ilja MASO (1964). 
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discern our methods by reference to what we say about the subject matter. Our 
methods are organized around, and take many of their initiatives from, the 
complexity and circumstances of the case at hand." (LYNCH & BOGEN 
1996, p. 15)  
So again, they present their own, ethnomethodological work on the data as 
"ordinary" and intelligible to "any member". And then they construct a contrast 
between this ordinary way of knowing with what are presented as ideals in con-
ventional social science. 
"Although it is fashionable to attribute latent epistemologies to a text or prac-
tice being analyzed, ethnomethodology's approach to practical action and 
practical reasoning is more in line with the Aristotelian concept of 'phronesis.' 
Unlike episteme – the geometrical method of deducing proofs from axioms – 
phronesis takes its departure from the conventional recognizability of a per-
spicuous case. The presumption is that a community of readers will grasp 
enough of the details in question, with no need to justify such understanding 
on ultimate grounds, so that relevant maxims and precedents can be brought to 
bear on the case and extended to others like it. The failure of such a method to 
live up to the universal standards of procedure and proof associated with 
Euclidean geometry carries no necessary stigma. Indeed, it can be argued that 
science and mathematics do not fully exemplify episteme, and that at the mo-
ment of their production all inquiries involve an effort to come to terms with 
relevant circumstances." (LYNCH & BOGEN 1996, p. 15)  
In effect, then, the authors offer a contrast between "ordinary" understanding 
practices and "formal" idealisations concerning proper ways of knowing, that 
are ascribed to mathematics and the sciences, although they suggest that even 
inquiries that fall under the latter auspices in actual fact also require "ordinary" 
practices of understanding (cf. for further elaborations and illustrations: LIV-
INGSTON 1986; LYNCH 1985, 1993). So, rather than claiming adherence to a 
set of formal principles, they, as ethnomethodologists, refer to their co-mem-
bership of a "community of readers" as a good enough basis for the intelligibil-
ity of their research materials as well as their own elaborations of those materi-
als.  
"Ethnomethodology makes a topic of cases under inquiry in law, medicine, 
science, and daily life. This does not necessarily place the ethnomethodologist 
at a metaphysical or epistemological advantage vis-à-vis the practical actions 
studied, since any analysis of such actions is itself responsible for coming to 
terms with the circumstantially specific and immanently recognizable features 
of the case before it." (LYNCH & BOGEN 1996, p. 15)  
They are not after some sort of "deeper" understanding of what happened and 
they do not try to replace one or another theory of meaning with their own. And 
neither are they trying to evaluate the truth value of one or another version of 
"what happened". 
"In view of the fact that so much social-scientific, literary, and philosophical 
effort has been devoted to getting to the bottom of discourse, our aim of stick-
ing to the surface of the text may strike some readers as curious. It is our view, 
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however, that any deeper readings would have to ignore the complexity and 
texture of the surface events, and thus they would fail to explicate how an or-
der of activities is achieved as a contingent, moment-by-moment production." 
(LYNCH & BOGEN 1996, p. 16)  
What should again be evident in these remarks is that ethnomethodology takes 
a very special position vis à vis commonsense knowledge and ways of know-
ing. They constitute an unavoidably used resource, but are also the topic of 
inquiry, to repeat what I have noted earlier referring to ZIMMERMAN and 
POLLNER (1971). We can note, moreover, two important consequences of this 
position. The first is that in the "first phase" of their inquiries, ethnomethodolo-
gists' reliance on commonsense methods of knowing puts them in a relation of 
cultural colleagues vis à vis their readers, and therefore they do not need any 
special warrants for their claims to understanding their materials. The second, 
however, connected to the second phase of inquiry, necessitates that they take a 
distance vis à vis the differential interests and disputes of commonsense life. So 
in the case of LYNCH and BOGEN, they are not in a position to take issue 
with the disputes they study, but rather they study the ways in which these 
differences are "produced" in the circumstances in which they occur. The label 
used to point to this particular kind of distantiation is "ethnomethodological 
indifference", which I will take up again in the last section of this article.  
6. Using One's Membership Knowledge to Study  
Membership in Action 
Although ethnomethodology has a single origin, Harold GARFINKEL, it does 
not have a single and unitary program. For instance, the methodological and 
epistemological distances between ethnomethodology à la GARFINKEL and 
conversation analysis (CA) seems in some respects so large, that many consider 
the latter to be a discipline of its own, related to ethnomethodology but still 
basically different. These and other differentiations are specially prominent 
when we consider the themes of this issue, "subjectivity" and "reflexivity".  
6.1 Using recordings 
In scanning programmatic, methodological, and substantive writings, one may 
find a variety of confessions, denials, or evasions of "subjectivity". I already 
noted a quite heavy reliance on recordings, transcriptions, and literal quotation. 
These can be seen as devices to evade subjectively accountable renderings of 
data. Harvey SACKS explicates his reasons for working with recordings as 
follows: 
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"I started to work with tape-recorded conversations. Such materials had a sin-
gle virtue, that I could replay them. I could transcribe them somewhat and 
study them extendedly – however long it might take. The tape-recorded mate-
rials constituted a 'good enough' record of what happened. Other things, to be 
sure, happened, but at least what was on the tape had happened. It was not 
from any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation of 
what should be studied that I started with tape-recorded conversations, but 
simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and 
again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I had stud-
ied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they wanted to be able to 
disagree with me." (SACKS 1984, p. 26)  
So for him recordings had two important advantages, they allowed repeated 
study and they could be shared. Repeated study of a recording has an objectify-
ing effect. It allows one to discover phenomena which would otherwise remain 
hidden in the fast flux of life, that is, recordings have an important heuristic or 
analytic utility. The possibility to share one's material with others adds to this 
objectification. It makes the evidence on which analytic claims are based ac-
cessible to others, and so enhances its evidential utility.12 HERITAGE and AT-
KINSON present similar argument, but in even stronger "objectivist" terms: 
"[T]he use of recorded data serves as a control on the limitations and fallibilities 
of intuition and recollection; it exposes the observer to a wide range of interac-
tional materials and circumstances and also provides some guarantee that ana-
lytic conclusions will not arise as artifacts of intuitive idiosyncracy, selective at-
tention or recollection or experimental design. The availability of a taped record 
enables repeated and detailed examination of particular events in interaction and 
hence greatly enhances the range and precision of the observations that can be 
made. The use of such materials has the additional advantage of providing hear-
ers and, to a lesser extent, readers of research reports with direct access to the 
data about which analytic claims are being made, thereby making them available 
for public scrutiny in a way that further minimizes the influence of individual 
preconception." (HERITAGE & ATKINSON 1984, p. 4) 
Recordings, then, transform the recorded events into transportable "objects", or 
to use an expression coined by Bruno LATOUR (1987, p. 228) "immutable 
mobiles", which provide for its examinability and share-ability. In a sense then, 
conversation analysts take a "realist" or "objectivist" position vis à vis re-
cordings. Transcriptions, on the other hand, are conceived in a different man-
ner, while recordings are seen as the real data, transcriptions only offer a handy 
approximation. HUTCHBY and WOOFFITT (1998, p. 74), for instance, sug-
gest to treat a transcript as a "representation", while the tape should provide a 
"reproduction" of the original event. HERITAGE and ATKINSON formulate 
the issue as follows: 
"[C]onversation analysts do not claim that the transcription system captures 
the details of a tape recording in all its particulars, or that a transcript should 
                                                             
12  The idea that records and transcripts have both an "analytic utility" and an "evidential utility" 
has been discussed in these terms by ASHMORE and REED (2000). 
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(or even could) be viewed as a literal representation of, or observationally 
adequate substitute for, the data under analysis. Like all transcription systems, 
the one used (in CA) is necessarily selective [...] and indeed this system is par-
ticularly concerned with capturing the sequential features of talk." (HERI-
TAGE & ATKINSON 1984, p. 12)  
Conversation analysts do use a more or less "standardized" transcription "sys-
tem", developed over the years by Gail JEFFERSON (cf. JEFFERSON 1985, 
for example), but like any standardised system, it requires "individual" and 
"local" decisions for its application in practice. These ad hoc practices remain 
mostly hidden and are rarely if ever examined in detail.13  
In a next phase, the analyst tries to "understand" what is happening on the 
tape and what the recorded utterances "mean" and "do" in their sequential 
context (TEN HAVE 1999, pp. 34-35). Tapes and transcript as-understood-by-
the-researcher are then the "real data" for a CA analysis. As discussed by Roy 
TURNER in the previously given quotation, the analyst inevitably uses his or 
her membership knowledge to understand the transcript (and also to make 
sensible transcripts, of course). Within the CA research tradition, two special 
strategies have become established to try to correct possible idiosyncrasies in 
hearing/seeing and understanding. The first, relying on what is available in the 
data themselves, already noted before, consists of inspecting the data for ex-
plicit and implicit formulations or demonstrations of understandings by the 
participants in the recorded interactions themselves. The second relies on the 
data's share-ability indicated in the quotes from SACKS and HERITAGE and 
ATKINSON above. It is called a "data session" and consists of analysts coming 
together for a free discussion of some piece(s) of data, i.e. tape recordings 
and/or transcripts. In this context individual insights and intuitions can be ex-
changes and criticised freely under the auspices of the basic rule that any ar-
gument has to be made "in the presence of data", that is referring to the details 
of actual cases as available in the research materials at hand. In this way, one 
can try to promote an intersubjectively constituted understanding in an early 
phase of the research trajectory. In such a session, the tape functions as a 
"given object", while all subsequent re-workings of it – transcription, under-
standing and analysis – are open to intersubjective scrutiny.14  
The CA convention to publish data excerpts (transcriptions) together with 
the analytic claims that are made on their basis, is another strategy to provide 
for a data-based discussion of CA analyses. CA, therefore, can be characterised 
as a research tradition in which "subjectivity", in the sense of subjective intui-
                                                             
13  Making transcription is a practical activity and therefore inescapably has all the ad hoc proper-
ties that GARFINKEL (1967a) has discussed. For more extended discussions of recording and 
transcription, see TEN HAVE (1999, pp.47-98, and 2002) and ASHMORE and REED (2000). 
14  Cf. TEN HAVE (1999, pp.123-125) for a more elaborate discussion of data sessions, and 
especially JORDAN and HENDERSON (1990) for a description of one research setting's 
practices. 
46 
tions, is given a legitimate place in the early phases of the research.15 In later 
phases, however, a double-faced discipline is supposed to be exercised. On the 
one hand there is an obligation to provide supportive data, and also to be open 
to seemingly contrary evidence, in the form of "deviant case analysis" (cf. TEN 
HAVE 1999, pp. 136-137 and passim). And on the other hand, there is an ex-
pectation to subject one's analytic insights and conclusions, together with the 
relevant data, to the critical considerations of one's analytic colleagues.  
6.2 Detached observation 
In those ethnomethodological studies that rely on direct observation, rather 
than mediated observation through recordings, the picture is rather different, 
and quite varied as well. Some reports of ethnographic studies from an ethno-
methodological perspective are written in a rather detached manner, reporting 
on what there was to be seen and heard without taking the observer's "personal" 
involvement into account. David SUDNOW's (1967) study of hospital routines, 
Passing on: the social organization of dying, is a case in point. Although some 
of the scenes he described must have been quite dramatic, and he lets you feel 
the horror of some of the standard routines as well, the overall tone is detached, 
almost impersonal. In D. Lawrence WIEDER's (1974) study of a half-way 
house for paroled (ex-?) addicts, Language and social reality: the case of tell-
ing the convict code, the person of the researcher has a greater "presence" in the 
text. He reports how he interacted with staff and residents, what they told him 
or refused to talk about, how he learned to see things in terms of "the prison 
code", etc. In a later study by David SUDNOW, Ways of the hand: the organi-
zation of improvised conduct (1978, also 2001), the researcher takes central 
stage, in fact he is almost the only one on the stage as the study deals with the 
author's learning to improvise jazz at the piano. This is a perfect example of the 
second strategy discussed before, that of "becoming the phenomenon". But still 
the overall tone of the report is quite detached. It is the learning process that is 
in focus, not the piano playing person.  
6.3 Two exceptional studies 
I think it is fair to say that ethnomethodological studies tend to be quite de-
tached. When the researcher figures at all in the text, his or her observations 
and experiences are used to gain access to the phenomena of interest, but not in 
terms of a personal involvement. There are exceptions, however. A first case 
can be found in David GOODE's (1994) book A world without words: the 
social construction of children born deaf and blind. He reports on two studies 
                                                             
15  Within CA this is often expressed in terms of an "unmotivated looking" at data (cf. TEN 
HAVE 1999, pp.102-103). 
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of the life of severely disabled children which involved him in a period of very 
intense interaction with these girls. He is not afraid to write about his emotions, 
even analysing his dreams, but still these reports can be seen as providing evi-
dence for the problems and possibilities of "achieving human understanding". 
In his efforts to gain an understanding of the rather closed and individual life-
world of one of these children, he even tried to simulate her limitations for 
himself by using wax ear stops and gauzed his left eye with a single layer of 
lightweight gauze to simulate the scar tissue that covers the girl's left eye (pp. 
33-34). By mimicking her actions under these conditions, he could gain some 
understanding of what she got out of seemingly bizarre repetitive movements. 
In a way he tried to overcome the limitations of his ordinary membership, for 
which she lacked the physical requirements. He also played with her a lot, in 
which he let her lead him, and involve him in her world. He contrasts these 
"free" interactions, and the possibilities for understanding which they provide, 
with the knowledge about such children which is produced in test situations 
and clinical encounters, which is extremely limited and therefore "unjust". In 
these ways he is much more "involved", in the sense of engagé, than is usual in 
ethnomethodology.  
Another exceptional report is provided by Albert ROBILLARD's (1999) 
book Meaning of a Disability: The Lived Experience of Paralysis. As the blurb 
has it: "When ethnomethodologist Albert ROBILLARD began to suffer the 
symptoms of motor-neuron disease, he realized he was a living laboratory for 
revealing the countless taken-for-granted methods people use to weave their 
lives together." ROBILLARD's medical condition not only requires many 
hours of specialised care each day, but it also leaves him almost motionless and 
speechless in his (wheel) chair, depending intensely on those around him. He 
can only communicate by using a self-devised "system" of rudimentary head 
and lip movements to indicate letters. These have to be read one-by-one by a 
trained interpreter, who then can voice or type the words so formed. It goes 
without saying that this process is very time consuming and requires immense 
patience from all concerned, the author himself, his interpreters and his interac-
tion partners. All too many people drop out of this, avoiding eye-contact and 
casual chatting, or reverting to a kind of staccato questioning and guessing 
game. Again, this report is not a detached one, but deeply personal. One of the 
major emotions that is expressed in its pages is anger. What raises his anger is 
that so often he is left out of the living tissue of everyday interaction, but at the 
same time, he holds up a grim mirror showing how we shut off those who can 
not follow our pace.  
One of the aspects that these two reports have in common is that they raise 
moral issues concerning the membership of those persons who lack the ordi-
nary physical capacities for participation in intersubjective communication. 
The social result of such communicative disabilities is mixed. On occasion, it 
may lead others to try to reach these people in ingenious and time-consuming 
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ways, but more often it means that they suffer from actual denials of co-mem-
bership. GOODE contrasts his still limited possibilities to "share" some of the 
experiences of the girl in and through extensive play sessions, with what he 
calls the "animal treatment", consisting of positive/negative reward training, 
that she often received from staff personnel. ROBILLARD reports many occa-
sions in which he was effectively excluded by being denied participation in 
interaction, heads turning away, being pushed around without consultation, 
being talked about in his presence, etc. In these studies, then, the rather special 
membership conditions of the researchers vis à vis the research subject – 
through virtual participation in GOODE's case and actual identity for ROBIL-
LARD – raised the topic of membership in an especially poignant way.  
6.4 Studying specialised competencies 
As noted before, recent ethnomethodological research is quite often focussed 
on the capacities needed for rather special "trades" such as advanced mathemat-
ics (LIVINGSTON 1986), laboratory science (LYNCH, LIVINGSTONE & 
GARFINKEL 1983; LYNCH 1985) or law practice (TRAVERS & MANZO 
1997). GARFINKEL has in the 1970s urged his students to get specialised 
training in one of these trades in order to study from the inside how their practi-
tioners created their particular version of a social "order" – which he spelled 
with an asterisk, as "order*" to indicate that he used it as "a collector and a 
proxy for any and every topic of logic, meaning, method, reason, and order" 
(GARFINKEL & WIEDER 1992, note 1, p. 202). It is in this context that he 
has formulated the "unique adequacy requirement of methods":  
"[...] the unique adequacy requirement of methods is identical with the re-
quirement that for the analyst to recognize, or identify, or follow the develop-
ment of, or describe phenomena of order* in local production of coherent de-
tail the analyst must be vulgarly competent in the local production and 
reflexively natural accountability of the phenomenon of order he is 'studying.'" 
(GARFINKEL & WIEDER 1992, p. 182)  
In other words, GARFINKEL has admonished his students to acquire specific 
membership competencies, in order to gain access to the competences that are 
actually used in specialised local practices.  
7. Discussion 
So what we have seen is that across the range of ethnomethodological and con-
versation analytic studies, a researcher's claimed membership of some collec-
tivity is always at issue. In CA, researchers mainly rely on their general mem-
bership competencies – referring to "mastery of natural language" – in order to 
understand the interactions they are studying. In the exceptional studies of 
49 
GOODE and ROBILLARD, on the other hand, the membership they used and 
studied could be located on a deeper, "existential" level, i.e. "being a person" 
and being treated as such. Finally, recent ethnomethodological studies of rather 
specialised trades still requires the active use of membership, neither the gen-
eral "mastery of natural language" nor the general existential one, but requiring 
extensive training. "Subjectivity" in ethnomethodological research, then, is a 
non-issue when conceived of in conventional terms, but a core issue when 
respecified as being a member, practically competent in the lived order* being 
studied.  
So what about "reflexivity"? As suggested before, "reflexivity basically just 
denotes an object's relation to itself", but it has been used in a variety of special 
senses in various recent programs for the human and social sciences (cf. 
LYNCH 2000 for an inventory). In most of these, an element of inescapable 
relativism is combined with an obligation of self-consciousness. On the one 
hand, the suggestion is offered that since any research's results are dependent 
on researchers' subjectivities and "standpoints" objective knowledge is neither 
possible nor desirable. And on the other hand, researchers are admonished to be 
clear about the impact of their subjectivity and standpoint on the knowledge 
they produce. This may even lead to a kind of proud evocation of subjectivity, 
or at least the presentation of the research as a respectful dialogue of subjectiv-
ities.  
Most ethnomethodologists seem to want to have nothing to do with such 
subjectivistic heroism.16 For them, ethnomethodological reflexivity – if used at 
all – refers to an inescapable property of accountable actions, in line with 
GARFINKEL's definitions explicated above. Reflexivity, in that sense, is not a 
matter of choice, let alone obligation, but a property of human life that is con-
stitutive of the possibility of ethnomethodological studies. As MACBETH 
notes: 
"Although ethnomethodological studies are not a single program [...], they 
tend to show a common interest in describing the constitutive practices and 
order-productive work of familiar, competent worlds. Rather than proposing a 
realist or relativist program, they tend to be nonskepticist and have no quarrels 
with the natives as to whether they could know what they are up to [...]." 
(MACBETH 2001, p. 60, n. 21)  
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